



SEC-2010.4.1-1
AFTERMATH CRISIS MANAGEMENT – PHASE I
- ACRIMAS -

D2.2 REPORT ON MISFITS

Grant Agreement number:	261669
Project acronym:	ACRIMAS
Project title:	Aftermath Crisis Management System-of-systems Demonstration
Funding Scheme:	CSA - supporting
Date of latest version of Annex I (DoW):	2011-01-13
Deliverable:	D2.2
Version and date of deliverable:	v2 as of 2012-04-10

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List of Abbreviations

(Referring to both deliverables, D2.1 and D2.2)

AKNZ	Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Protection
BBK	German Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance
BMG	German Federal Ministry of Health
BMI	German Federal Ministry of the Interior
BMU	German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety
C2	Command and Control
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCA	Crisis Coordination Arrangement
CCAEx	Crisis Coordination Arrangement Exercise
CCB	Greek Central Coordination Body for Civil Protection
CEP	Civil Emergency Planning
CeSAM	Centre for Community Development and Local Mobilisation
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHOD	Chief of Defence
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CM	Crisis Management
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
COP	Common Operation Picture
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
COSI	Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security
CP	Civil Protection
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CRT	Civilian Response Team
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy (formerly ESDP)
DE	Demonstration and Experimentation
DG	Directorate General
DPC	Italian Civil Protection Department
DRK	German Red Cross
EADRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Commission
ECFF	European Centre for Forest Fires
ECHO	Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service
EERC	European Emergency Response Centre
EP	European Parliament
EPPO	Earthquake Planning and Protection Organization
ESDC	European Security and Defence College
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EU ISS	EU Institute for Security Studies
EU MS	EU Member State
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMS	EU Military Staff

EUR-OPA	European and Mediterranean Major Hazards Agreement
EUSC	EU Satellite Centre
EUSF	EU Solidarity Fund
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GAC	General Affairs Council
GMLZ	German Joint Information and Situation Centre
GNI	Gross National Income
GSCP	Greek General Secretariat of Civil Protection
HR	High Representative
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
ICNP	Greek Inter-Ministerial Committee for National Planning
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IIS	Instrument for Stability
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JRC	Joint Research Center
LÜKEX	German Cross-state Crisis Management Exercise
MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
MIC	Monitoring and Information Centre
MilRep	Military Representative
MS	Member State
MSB	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OC	Operational Center
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHQ	Operational Headquarter
OSOCC	On-Site Operations Coordination Centre
PSC	Political and Security Committee
RELEX	Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SITCEN	Joint Situation Centre
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SRC	Swedish Red Cross
SRT	Swedish Response Teams
SWIFT	Swedish International Fast Response Team
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
THW	German Federal Agency for Technical Relief
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UN/OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VP	Vice President
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Background information on ACRIMAS - Aftermath Crisis Management System-of-systems Demonstration, Phase I

ACRIMAS objectives

ACRIMAS is a 15 months Support Action with 15 partners from 10 European countries, which shall develop a roadmap for an upcoming Demonstration Project (in Phase II) within Crisis Management (CM).

This roadmap will elaborate a systematic development process for CM systems, procedures and technologies in Europe, to be implemented within the demonstration project.

The process aims for gradual evolvement of CM capabilities through demonstration and experimentation (DE) activities, transfer of related knowledge between stakeholders and by promoting an environment for co-development of CM technology and methodology where users, providers and researchers work together.

ACRIMAS further emphasises community-building which will be considerably supported by the execution of the subsequent Phase II, bringing together the various key stakeholders and the available DE infrastructures in a case-by-case demonstration or experimentation activity.

ACRIMAS work approach

Large-scale incidents (man made and natural) inside and outside the EU require a coordinated response from crisis managers and first responders across Europe and with resources from all levels of government. Currently, CM in the EU can be regarded as a highly diversified 'system-of-systems' integrating organisations and components with different cultures, policies and assets, and various stakeholders and procurement schemes.

To identify the critical areas and topics within this current CM 'system-of-systems' which need to be addressed by the demonstration programme in Phase II, ACRIMAS follows a scenario-based and user-centric work approach.

ACRIMAS is scenario-based in the sense that characteristic CM scenarios will be identified, selected and developed to constitute a sound basis for ensuring the work of posing user needs and requirements, identifying current weaknesses and gaps in CM in Europe, looking at potential solutions and documenting corresponding demonstration topics and Research & Development (R&D) needs to be integrated in a roadmap for Phase II. The scenario approach embraces an all-hazard view, including the EU external dimension.

ACRIMAS is user-driven in the sense that users and other stakeholders in terms of first responders, authorities and governmental bodies as well as the supply side are actively involved throughout the project process, some of them as full partners, most of them linked to the project through a supporting Expert Group and dedicated project workshops. They play a central role in complementing and validating the scenario analysis by expressing their needs and requirements regarding the identification of relevant CM topics, which should be addressed by DE activities in Phase II, and the demonstration concept to be elaborated.

ACRIMAS expected results

ACRIMAS will prepare a roadmap setting out the main areas and relevant topics of CM to be addressed by the Phase II. In addition, ACRIMAS will deliver a demonstration concept for Phase II, describing how and where the DE activities in Phase II should be conducted.

Terms used and their understanding in ACRIMAS

According to the call text of SEC-2010.4.1-1 “Aftermath crisis management – Phase I”, the ACRIMAS project has to focus on ‘aftermath crisis management’ as it was outlined, i.e. that it covers the response to and recovery from large-scale disasters (man-made and natural) inside and outside Europe. However, the ACRIMAS project felt the need to briefly state its understanding of the relevant terms used to achieve a common understanding, as in particular in the scientific community the term “crisis management” not necessarily need to be understood as “disaster response and recovery”.

The prefix “aftermath” has been used to indicate the focus on the management of disasters, rather than the prevention. However, this should be understood as all phases of management, from preparation before a disaster hits to the evaluation and lessons learned processes that take place after the relief mission has ended. Also, at least the initial phases of the reconstruction phase are also included in the ACRIMAS concept of aftermath crisis management.

The term “crisis management” can mean different things in different parts of the EU. When discussing the community mechanism one usually means something like disaster management, albeit with a wide understanding of the term “disaster”. Within the discourse of the CSDP, the term “crisis management” can mean any situation for which the instruments within the CSDP are applicable. This means it can include missions such as nation building, establishment and development of rule of law or even military intervention up the level of warfare.

In ACRIMAS, we include quite a wide range of disasters (for example both humanitarian disasters such as famine and accident-type disasters such as nuclear incidents), we include all phases from preparation to early recovery and we include more or less all activities clearly related to this. We do not include preventive measures, nor do we consider military intervention or anything concerning re-building of political structures in foreign countries.

In general, the ACRIMAS project refers to terms and definitions as provided by ISO in its TC on Societal Security (TC 223):

- **Crisis:**
incident affecting a society with the potential to cause loss or damage to persons, property or the environment which requires extraordinary coordination, resources, and skills in response
- **Crisis management:**
process of planning and implementing measures aimed at preventing, reducing, responding and recovering from a crisis
- **Disaster:**
situation where [...] losses have occurred which exceeded the ability of the affected organization, community or society to cope using its own resources
- **(Disaster) response & recovery:**
 - *Response:* measures taken during or immediately after a disaster to meet the immediate needs of the affected and minimising the impact on the incident
 - *Recovery:* activities designed to return conditions to an equivalent level acceptable to society
- **“Aftermath crisis management”** (ACRIMAS understanding): the response to & recovery from large-scale disasters (man-made or natural) inside and outside Europe.

Preliminary remarks

Because of their strong correlation and interdependencies, the results of WP2 have been composed in one combined report (which will be published). This report has been divided in the two deliverables D2.1 “Report on current CM framework” and D2.2 “Report on misfits”. For reasons regarding the understanding of the context, the executive summaries, the introductions as well as the final chapters on “summary and recommendations” are equal in both deliverables, though – where possible – indicating which parts refer to which deliverable.

Executive Summary

Context description

The description of the political and legal framework of aftermath CM in the EU, subject of work package (WP) 2 in ACRIMAS, is mainly supposed to provide the overview necessary for ACRIMAS on the current political and legal (institutional) set-up of aftermath CM in Europe to be taken into account when identifying and recommending activities for the subsequent demonstration project on aftermath CM, the Phase II. It serves the need to understand the political and legal mechanisms in which CM operations are embedded and organized in the Member States (MS) and the EU. Amongst others, it provides political and legal issues that should be considered in the tasks and mission analysis (WP3) and in the gaps and requirements analysis (WP4).

Deliverable D2.1 “Report on current CM framework” comprises the description of the current institutional, political and legal setups in the MSs and the EU as well as their anticipated trends. Deliverable D2.2 “Report on misfits” comprises challenges for an enhanced aftermath CM system in the EU concerning the political and legal setup.

Approach

To describe the political and legal framework of aftermath CM in the EU, both the EU level and the MS level have been assessed. For the EU level, main instruments, laws and regulations, relevant institutions and their roles and responsibilities have been described. For the MS level, four case study countries have been selected, trying to cover important factors and their different characteristics that have strong influence on the political and legal setup: a) Germany, b) Italy, c) Sweden, and d) Greece.

The description resulting from a literature analysis was complemented by interviews conducted with relevant experts and stakeholders in the field of (aftermath) CM, or derived from other, informal expert discussions. In addition, the ACRIMAS project workshop on 30 June 2011 in Bonn, Germany, where WP2 results were presented and discussed with CM stakeholders, helped to validate and complement the results.

Results

The investigation of the legal and political framework of aftermath CM in the EU and the EU MSs has provided important insights into the institutional and political set-up, laws and regulations relevant in disaster response and recovery in the EU. Not only the current situation, but also anticipated trends have been identified, indicating the overall direction of the future legal and political framework of CM in the EU and its MSs [D2.1].

In addition to the current framework and the trends, challenges to be faced with regard to the development of a more coherent “System of Systems” structure for aftermath CM in the EU have been formulated [D.2.2].

EU: Current situation and anticipated trends in the legal and political framework [D2.1]

The Lisbon Treaty has provided new conditions for EU cooperation in aftermath CM. It calls for a firmer establishment of internal security cooperation (→ establishment of the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security – COSI; political obligation to act in accordance with the Solidarity Clause), a more coherent external EU action (→ e.g. establishment of the new function of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and European Commission Vice-President – HR/VP; establishment of the European External Action Service – EEAS), and a strengthened cooperation in the area of Civil Protection inside and outside the EU (→ Civil Protection as a “shared competence” between the Union and the MSs, defined in Article 196 TFEU¹). While prior to the Lisbon Treaty, each MS had the opportunity to block a decision, the measures that are taken to achieve the named objectives are now taken in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure.

In the EU, cooperation is guided by the principle of subsidiarity (a crisis or a disaster shall be managed at the lowest possible level), the principle of no duplications (not to duplicate capacities and structures that already exist), the principle of collective responsibility (the MSs collectively are responsible for the prevention of and the preparedness for a crisis) and the principle of solidarity (the MSs shall support each other in the event of a major crisis or emergency). These provisions pave the way for aftermath CM actions in the EU.

The Commission provides instruments and structures to facilitate the cooperation of MSs to prevent and respond to disasters inside and outside the EU, as well as it is itself an actor in disaster response and recovery. It encompasses Civil Protection, Humanitarian Aid, Consular Protection and the Solidarity Fund. The CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy), based with its components within the EEAS, serves the ability to contribute with civilian and military capacities to CM in order to promote peace and stability outside the EU. While civilian CSDP missions are key instruments, military disaster response on EU level is not been seen as a typical CSDP action. The Council provides the Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA), which are supposed to promote coordination at a high political level in the EU in relation to crises having an impact on several MSs or that are of political significance for the EU.

The EU recognizes the UN as a main coordinating actor within response to humanitarian crises outside of Europe. Thereby, coordination between EU and UN is of particular importance. There is already a strong collaboration between the EU and UN/OCHA, as well as with other UN agencies such as WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF.

NATO also has capacities for aftermath CM. Not least due to the fact that most EU MSs are also NATO members, there is a need for coordination between the EU and the NATO ambitions, both within the operational phases and within capacity building.

Due to climate change (amongst others), disasters are expected to increase in number and magnitude. Thus, the need for cooperation will most likely remain – if not even rise – in the near future. An open but important question is, how the Solidarity Clause will be materialized, and how to deal with the tension between solidarity and sovereignty regarding EU

¹ Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, consolidated version as of 30 March 2010.

cooperation. Also, the work on further coordinating the EU's different instruments will continue, including potential synergies between EEAS (CSDP) and European Commission activities. The work on coordination/ cooperation needs between the EU, UN and NATO in aftermath CM will continue.

EU: Challenges concerning the legal and political framework [D2.2]

In order for EU aftermath CM to be as efficient and effective as possible, further intra EU coordination is needed. This concerns especially the division of responsibilities between the EEAS and the Commission, which is not evident and whose interaction needs to be defined.

A basic challenge for EU cooperation is the fact that the political views regarding the future role of the EU in aftermath CM and also the ability to contribute differ among the MSs. As civil protection is a competence of the EU MSs, there are no commonly owned EU-assets, thus EU disaster response and recovery is dependent on the MSs' assets and their will to contribute.

The cooperation with other international organizations, especially UN and NATO, is very important, as they also have structures for aftermath CM.

A further challenge is to "close the gap" between partly high expectations among EU-citizens that the Union should do more to prevent for and respond to disasters, and the current capabilities of the EU.

With regard to CSDP several challenges could be identified, e.g. a lack of staff and slow political decision making processes.

Member State level: Current situation and anticipated trends in the legal and political framework [D2.1]

Given their competences in civil protection and disaster response & recovery, also the MSs are an important focus to derive a thorough overview of the legal and political framework of aftermath CM in the EU. Considering the rich diversity of the legal and organizational frameworks of MSs this has been a special challenge. In order to cover important factors and their different characteristics that have strong influence on the legal and political set-up – as the forms of government; the frequency, quantity and types of hazards; the traditions to receive and donate assistance; as well as the views on the Union's role in Civil Protection – the case studies Germany, Italy, Sweden and Greece were investigated. They serve as examples on the legal and political framework on MSs level, and also served as a basis to derive general characteristics that are relevant for all – or at least several – MSs in the EU.

Important factors that are responsible for differences in the aftermath CM framework at MS level are the governmental systems – decentralized systems (autonomy of administrative units in implementation and execution of disaster response and recovery policies) vs. centralized systems (a national department directly implements measures in case of intense disasters), and variants in between –, high or low occurrence of disasters, often offering or often requesting assistance to other countries, and systems less or highly compatible with EU legislation.

Also on MS level, relevant trends concerning the future legal and policy framework of CM were identified. These trends include the above mentioned differences in the views on the role that the EU should play with corresponding effects on the CM systems in the MSs, standardization processes, impacts of the demographic change, the role of the private sector, and the fact that operations more and more take place in urban areas and in volatile situations, where security of first responders plays an enhanced role.

Member State level: Challenges concerning the legal and political framework [D2.2]

Challenges for aftermath CM in Europe posed by the legal and political framework of the MSs level are widespread. An important field is coordination, which includes, amongst others, difficulties due to federal structures (which mirrors somehow the situation on EU level), different levels of equipment, infrastructure and knowledge, unclear chains of command, high levels of bureaucracy, different uses of terminology, and improvable media management. Conflicts of interests that form challenges include a skeptical attitude of MSs towards a strengthening of EU competences, influences of political goals on decisions to provide assistance or not, or insufficient critical reflections on past CM actions. Further challenges are financial restraints like the general economic situation of MSs, or the restriction that assistance is offered only under the condition that funding is provided.

Applicability

The applicability of WP2 results is mainly assured through the use and consideration of the legal and political framework in the further project work, e.g. when developing the roadmap for Phase II. But also already from the results on the legal and political framework some recommendations for Phase II could be derived: The different attitudes of MSs towards a strengthened role of the EU in aftermath CM need to be considered, so selected topics for Phase II should be consistent with different political and legal futures. A key question is how the interpretation of the Solidarity Clause and its implementation will develop – this evolution needs to be considered in Phase II and could also be directly addressed, thus proposing solutions on the difficult question how to implement the Solidarity Clause. As security of first responders once deployed might play an enhanced role, related security needs in volatile situations could be addressed in Phase II. Also, a reconstruction and recovery needs assessment under the CSDP civilian instrument is seen as added value and could thus be a useful element of the Phase II.

1. Introduction

In accordance with the tasks of the ACRIMAS work package 2 (WP2) “Political and Legal Framework”², it has to provide two deliverables: the main objective of the **report on current CM framework** [D2.1] is to describe the current political and legal framework and their anticipated trends in which aftermath crisis management (CM) operations in the EU Member States (MS) and at the EU level are embedded and organized. Based on this, future challenges regarding the achievement of stronger aftermath CM coherence within the EU are elaborated and described in the **report on misfits** [D2.2]. The overall results of WP2 is to be used and integrated in WP3 “Scenario-based Tasks & Mission Analysis” and in WP4, “Gaps and Requirements Analysis”, which will contribute to the elaboration of a roadmap for Phase II in WP6. Keeping this logic in mind, **both reports intend to provide the overview necessary for ACRIMAS on the current political and legal (institutional) set-up of aftermath CM in Europe to be taken into account when identifying and recommending activities for the subsequent demonstration project on aftermath CM, the Phase II.**

The two reports aim at providing in-depth knowledge about the factors that contribute to an uncertain future regarding a more coherent aftermath CM, and provide first recommendations on options that enable the development of an efficient System-of-Systems approach towards aftermath CM in Europe.

Both reports are structured into two main parts, one assessing structures at EU level and one assessing structures at MS level, to finally arrive at common conclusions and recommendations for the Phase II:

Report on D2.1

Chapter 2 analyses the current setup and future trends regarding legal and administrative CM structures at the EU level. Thereby, all relevant EU bodies involved in CM (The Commission, the Council and the European External Action Service) are comparatively screened, and evaluated regarding their legal and institutional provisions related to CM.

Chapter 3 analyses the heterogeneity of CM structures at the MS level, but also describes approaches and conditions for bi- or multilateral cooperation in CM. By choosing a case study approach (Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Greece) representing different national administrative structures and further differences in the EU, characteristics of the current diversified legal and administrative CM framework and their trends are presented.

Report on D2.2

Chapter 2 analyses the challenges regarding legal and administrative CM structures at the EU level described in chapter 2 of D2.1.

Chapter 3 analyses the challenges deriving from the case studies (Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Greece) and describes general challenges on MS level that are mainly extracted – and generalized – from the case studies.

Report D2.1 and report D2.2

Chapter 4 finally presents conclusions of both reports (D2.1/ D2.2) and provides recommendations for the Phase II – aspects, trends and challenges that should be considered as well as concrete suggestions on topics to be implemented in the demonstrations.

² ACRIMAS Grant Agreement No. 261669, Annex I Description of Work, section WT3, pg 6 ff

2. Challenges in the Political and Legal Framework of EU Aftermath Crisis Management

As described in D2.1, responsibility for aftermath CM is divided between the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, and there is a need to define how these EU-institutions shall interact in order for the Union to provide for an effective and efficient disaster response. EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and European Commission Vice-President (HR/VP) in cooperation with the Commission is expected to put forward suggestions on how further cooperation and coordination between the Commission and the EEAS could be achieved. The proposals are expected to be presented in the end of 2011.

In order to be able to meet the challenges, there is, among others, a need to develop a stronger and more coherent European disaster management capacity that includes the entire CM cycle – prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. The work on enhancing prevention and preparedness is key in the continuing work within the EU.³

At present an important work is ongoing in order to strengthen EU aftermath CM. The Commission presented in October 2010 proposals on how cooperation could become more effective, efficient, coherent and visible. Council Conclusions on the Communication were later on adopted in December 2010. Among the Commission's proposal is the establishment of a voluntary pool of civil protection resources to which the MSs can report capabilities that they can make available to the Union. One goal is to increase the predictability of MSs contributions and increase the political commitment of the MSs to contribute with resources to EU disaster response. Moreover, there is an ongoing work within the EU on updating the legal acts underpinning cooperation in the area of civil protection, including the financial instrument. Thus, discussions are now taking place among the MSs how to strengthen EU cooperation in the area based *inter alia* on the Commission's proposals.⁴

Today the EU and its MSs face both challenges and opportunities:

Further Coordination in the EU-system is needed

- EU structures and instruments for aftermath CM are divided between the EEAS and the Commission, the division of duty is not evident. In order for EU aftermath CM to be as efficient and effective as possible, further coordination and the establishment of related procedures is needed.

Member States Political Will and Risk/Threat Perception differ

- Opinions differ among the MSs regarding the future role of the EU in aftermath CM and humanitarian assistance. The EU can only become the type of actor that the MSs want it to be. The political will of the MSs as well as the actual ability to contribute to EU aftermath CM, in relation to for example the UN, is therefore key for the further development of the EU. With a lack of shared vision of the future role of the EU, the further development of cooperation in the area of disaster response will continue to be event-driven.

³ Ibid.

⁴ *Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance, European Commission Com 600 – final (2010):*
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/civil_protection/civil/prote/pdfdocs/COM_2010_600_European_disaster_response_en.pdf

- The MSs face different threats to their security, thus looking at the added value of EU-cooperation differently, some prefer that EU-assets are developed, some that focus is on preventive actions. There are no commonly owned EU-assets. EU disaster response is dependent on the MSs' assets and their willingness to contribute. In particular the Commission's proposal of an "European disaster management capacity" will have to be developed and shaped together with the MSs.

EU is just one of many actors on the international scene

- The UN and NATO also have structures for aftermath CM. Thus, cooperation with the UN and NATO will continue to be of great importance in relation to disasters outside the EU.

Expectation vs. Capabilities, a Gap?

- There are high expectations among the EU-citizens that the Union can act in the event of a disaster inside or outside the EU.⁵ The question remains to be answered if the EU is able to meet these expectations.

With regard to CSDP civilian and military instruments:

- Most of the CSDP civilian CM missions are already *understaffed* lacking both in numbers and in availability of qualified and trained personnel: discrepancies between the numbers of staff that MSs had indicated as potentially available for mission and the actual number of staff being seconded into missions. Moreover, there is *no "extra reserve"* of qualified professionals under CSDP civilian CM for disaster response and recovery. Therefore, in a situation where one would see feasible to use the instrument of the CSDP civilian CM for disaster response and recovery outside EU, the available professionals in national rescue services would have been already recruited depleting the pool of available experts.⁶
- The relatively *slow political decision making process* under CSDP does not suit well for responding humanitarian emergency situations where human lives are at stake: CSDP civilian response time would be somewhere between 5 to 35 days at the shortest. Moreover, the decision to launch a CSDP mission is very much *a political decision*, based also on MS's interests in a given situation and geographical, area and not purely on humanitarian imperative. Thus, if the civilian CM capabilities of the CSDP would be used in disaster response situations the most appropriate way to use the assets would be to utilize them only as an additional resource (CSDP assets as a last resource in line) in support of a disaster response and recovery or humanitarian relief operations (coordinated by OCHA for instance) where the other instruments and bodies of EU (e.g. ECHO, MIC) are in the fore front.⁷
- However, it could also be the case that a disaster takes place in an already challenging security environment, or due to the disaster the situation on the ground turns into violent which, in turn, could require additional protection for disaster responders. In this respect, one possibility to provide additional security could be to utilize either the CSDP military or civilian assets (e.g. European Gendarmerie Force type of police).⁸
- Another asset of the CSDP civilian CM that could be used in aftermath disaster response and recovery situations are the Crisis Response Teams (CRTs). The CRTs composed of experts with variety of societal expertise could be of great assistance in providing fact

⁵ *Civil protection - Full report, November 2009 and Humanitarian Aid - Report, European Commission – Eurobarometer (2010)*

⁶ *Draft final report on the civilian Headline goal, Council of the European Union 14769/1/10 (2010).*

Expert interviews conducted in June/ July 2011

⁷ Expert interviews conducted in June/ July 2011

⁸ *Ibid.*

finding type of analysis and needs assessment on the situation as well as preparing ground for rebuilding and recovery of the society after the crisis.⁹

- What comes to the CSDP military CM, the lack of a permanent OHQ leads to severe problems when it comes to the development and implementation of the military objectives of the HG2010, to military rapid reaction (also in the case of required rapid disaster response) and to case-to-case cooperation structures¹⁰
- Officially C2-structures are fully integrated, however, unofficially there are diverse parallel command lines and caveats, which “became one of the defining features of modern CM operations”, specially and due to a lack of trust, when it comes to intelligence collector assets. Also the official C2-structure for CSDP-missions is largely copied from the NATO structure (either direct use of NATO structure via Berlin Plus or created on the basis of lead nation that provides OHQ). Simultaneous civilian and military operations (e.g. in Bosnia) led to even more parallel command-structures and, thus, to a severe lack of coordination. One of the purposes for the implementation of the civil and military integrating CMPD is to overcome these coordinative hurdles.
- Missions are mainly based on assets that have to be requested from MS on an ad-hoc basis. A coordination mechanism for this procedure, however, is in place (see paragraph on EUMS). As a first assessment, it might be stressed that especially the lack of a rapid disaster response capability might lead to a delay of an appropriate EU reaction.
- Operational costs of providing military assets have to be covered by the offering MS.¹¹
- In order to match the civil set-up of disaster sites and not to endanger civil personnel on-site, used military equipment has to be adapted to a civil appearance. This means that e.g. also for a short stop-over of a military aircraft that delivers some kind of disaster relief equipment, the whole aircraft has to be re-painted.¹²
- As EUMS is requested by DG ECHO that usually represents to a certain extent NGOs, the support actions of EUMS are sometimes seen as being competitive to those of NGOs.
- Military satellite images are not accessible by the coordinating unit, i.e. DG ECHO, but by EUMS.¹³
- Major operational problems are due to non-existent or accessible airfields (one of the things that would have been needed to evacuate civilians and the first things that were destroyed during the Libya-conflict) and seaports to actually deliver the equipment and resources needed.¹⁴
- Further problems relate to the distribution of resources on-site, especially to fuel supply.¹⁵

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ *EUNity of Command – The Planning and Conduct of CSDP operations, Simón and Mattelaer/Royal Institute for International Relations - Egmont Paper 41 (2011)*

¹¹ Expert interviews conducted in June/ July 2011

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

3. Challenges in the Political and Legal Framework of Crisis Management on Member State level

The assessment of the political and legal framework of Germany, Italy, Sweden and Greece, (compare D2.1 report) revealed country specific CM-challenges that are listed and described in chapter 3.1 – 3.4. From the case study analysis, finally, general challenges affecting EU future CM policy development could be derived. They are presented in chapter 3.5.

3.1 Challenges within the Political and Legal Framework of Germany

- According to expert interviews, main challenges in civil protection in Germany are an issue of coordination. The states have own laws on police-led threat prevention, rescue services, fire protection and fire services, and disaster control and management. This leads to differences between the states with regard to command and control, training and equipment.¹⁶
- Also the quantity and quality of equipment, infrastructure and knowledge is different in the different states and communities. For example in communities that where venues in the football world cup 2010, the level is comparably high. Due to these differences, federal states also have different expectations on the support from the federal level.¹⁷
- The collaboration between states can be difficult due to a lack of compatibility (e.g. different use of terms). Experts see an improvement through LÜKEX and also the establishment of the Joint Information and Situation Centre (GMLZ) was supposed to improve the collaboration. But still, it is an information centre and cannot eliminate all difficulties; there is no instrument to avoid all difficulties in collaboration. Anyways, other experts see less problems in the collaboration between different federal states, especially as usually neighbouring states are concerned. The systems of the neighbouring states are usually known, more problems could arise if e.g. a northern state would need to collaborate with a southern state.
- Despite the principle of subsidiarity and responsibility of non-federal level authorities in most of the incidents, there is – according to experts – often public pressure on the federal level to react to certain incidents. This may lead to the situation that CM is perceived as insufficient by the public, although there is no legal basis for the federal state to act.
- Coordination of different relief organizations and units is challenging (e.g. avoid traffic jams; ensure a coordinated guidance of operations and a coordinated communication with the public). Thus, problems of coordination appear not only between different levels of hierarchy but also between governmental, parastatal and private actors. The amount of material and personnel is usually not the problem, rather the appropriate localization and coordination. For example during the Elbe flood 2002, the German Red Cross (DRK) requested material from a DRK institution further away while a corresponding relief organization of the Johanniter was located close-by. As a result, a challenging question is which resources should be kept where, which should be kept centralized and which decentralized.¹⁸
- The division of tasks and resources between the federal level and the state level can lead to redundancies (e.g. military resources and civil resources that actually provide the same)

¹⁶ *The Crisis Management System in Germany, Bundesministerium des Innern (2010):*
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/Sicherheit/BevoelkerungKrisen/system_krisenmanagement_en.html

¹⁷ Expert interviews conducted in June/ July 2011

¹⁸ Expert interviews conducted in June/ July 2011

and therefore to unprofitable investments – or to a capability gap, if both levels rely on the other one.

- In collaboration with other countries or the EU, language barriers can make response and recovery procedures more difficult.
- Some experts see a problem in insufficient critical reflections on past CM actions. A possible solution could be the establishment of an independent institution that evaluates CM actions and procedures.
- From experts' point of view, the ability of self-protection on household level in Germany is quite low as many people rely on public help. The strategy on modern civil protection of the BMI¹⁹ supports strengthening the self-help ability of people (e.g. through open risk and crisis communication). So far, in Germany citizens are mainly seen as victims or disrupter in disaster events. They should be more seen as a first responder and thus stronger involved in crisis prevention and preparation, their capacities should be improved and better used.²⁰
- However, sometimes the number of personnel/ people willing to help is too high (cf. Elbe flood 2002). If not appropriately managed, this can demotivate, especially volunteers.²¹
- In general, although Germany has experienced disasters (e.g. floods), some experts see that CM systems have barely been tested as Germany is not often affected by large scale disasters. So far, the balance between threat prevention and losses by disasters is judged moderate by experts.

3.2 Challenges within the Political and Legal Framework of Italy

Inside Italy

In order to achieve efficient risk and disaster management, roles and responsibilities of civil protection authorities in Italy need to be developed at every level of public administration, regardless the model chosen in a region to exercise such responsibilities.²² Although, a constitutional reform transferred operational responsibility to the local level, the 'Bassanini' Decree-Law (1998) enforcement on devolution (decentralized power) is still very low and varies across regions. Thus, hardly any transfer of emergency response functions and resources to the municipalities with which the mayors could operate has happened so far. The prefect's willingness to hand over responsibility for civil protection to the municipalities is still very limited, too. Especially, municipalities located in regions with high disaster risk levels, have a very low level of capacity for civil protection. The recruitment of volunteers differs considerably across the country; in particular in the south of Italy the level is low.²³ Thus, high priority should be given to law enforcement activities to achieve a more equal distribution of capacities for civil protection in all regions of Italy. In addition to the current slow process of decentralization of CM structures in Italy, there is far too much legislation on civil protection, and it is piecemeal leading to conflicting laws.²⁴

¹⁹ *Strategie für einen modernen Bevölkerungsschutz, Grundsatzpapier des Bundesministerium des Inneren (2009):*

http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/Sicherheit/BevoelkerungKrisen/grundsatzstrategie_moderner_bevoelkerungsschutz.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

²⁰ Expert interviews conducted in June/ July 2011

²¹ Expert interviews conducted in June/ July 2011

²² *Review of the Italian National Civil Protection System, OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies (2010)*

²³ Expert interviews conducted in June/ July 2011

²⁴ Ibid.

In collaboration with EU

According to expert opinion, Italy brought two major institutional innovations to the EU which could in turn improve operational cooperation in CM: One is the introduction of a CM model in which civil protection is an appendage of the national cabinet under the prime minister that has motivated the EU to develop a non-binding EU directive already adopted by, amongst others, the UK and Sweden. In line with this the OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies states that “*there are clear tendencies in different MSs of a development following the Italian line that focuses on a central government involvement to enhance coordination between safety and security government administration even at a common location*”²⁵. Another institutional innovation is the gradual fusion of domestic and European disaster response and international humanitarian activities, adopted by the EC DG Civil Protection and ECHO.

In collaboration with other international actors

The types of international missions that the DPC can carry out were firstly defined by Act no 49 of 1987, which states that the Italian cooperation with developing countries aims at maintaining “*solidarity among people and full realization of the fundamental human rights, inspired by the principles enshrined in the United Nations' charter and by the conventions between the European Union and the ACP countries*”, and at “*fulfilling primary needs*”. The DPC competence is determined by Article 11 of L225/92, that highlights that international intervention in disasters or extraordinary events can be carried out in agreement with the Head of the Department of Civil Protection. This part of the legislative framework drafted for international interventions, however, has been substantially neglected throughout the years, so that in 2005, Act no 152 was adopted, underlining that the DPC is competent for operating in international crises in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Act further highlights that the President of the Council of Ministers or the Head of the DPC can issue and delegate ad hoc emergency ordinances aiming at avoiding dangerous situations or further damage to people and goods abroad. This is an extremely important feature of the law, permitting the DPC to exercise the same powers as for emergencies occurring on Italian territory.²⁶

3.3 Challenges within the Political and Legal Framework of Sweden

The focus of the review of challenges is with the aspects of international collaboration of Sweden but perhaps one remark can be made out of the general CM framework of Sweden.

By the Swedish constitution, the ministries are not allowed to intervene in the everyday work of agencies. Therefore, the agencies enjoy a high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the ministries and also, because they are, collectively, much larger than the Government Offices (ministries). In practice, the agencies, to a large extent, define and tailor measures and standards of performance for their needs, which makes performance management an illusive task. The relationship between agencies and ministries is, in Sweden, by tradition informal and trust based. Agencies are highly influential in the policy process, and despite constitutionally set demarcation lines between political and administrative mandates, responsibilities in reality are not carved in stone.²⁷

²⁵ *Review of the Italian National Civil Protection System, OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies (2010)*

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ *Effects of Buzzwords on Experiential Learning: The Swedish Case of ‘Shared Situation Awareness’, Dan Hansén/Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management vo 17 - No° 3 (2010)*

As regards the capability of Sweden to receive and make use of international assistance in case of a major incident in Sweden, there is an ongoing inquiry to map the process as well as possible challenges in this respect. There are no findings available yet, though.²⁸

In collaboration with EU and other international actors

Bearing in mind that Sweden is capable of and is participating actively in international operations and frequently offering assistance, there seem to be very few political or legal challenges hindering the international cooperation of Sweden in disaster response and recovery. Most of the challenges are on the very practical level, however, a couple of political challenges can be identified.

- Solidarity and humanity issues are obvious grounds for the Swedish government's willingness to participate in international assistance operations, but also other political goals can be influential in the decision making process on whether a response operation is to be conducted or not. Moreover, the mandate is always limited by financial restraints. A common occurrence is that the government decides in favour of response operations under the condition that funding is provided by SIDA or another organisation. Providing that the decision to participate is taken, the funding can be secured at short notice.²⁹

Challenges also lie with the security situation in a disaster area or area of humanitarian crisis. Sometimes the circumstances are assessed to pose too great risk for the safety of response workers and therefore, the engagement in the particular mission is deemed infeasible. In other cases, and with regard to the recovery phase of a disaster, the engagement is perceived infeasible if the assessment on the situation implies that the actors already present in the area should be capable of handling the situation by themselves or it would actually be the time to start phasing out from the mission.³⁰

Practical challenges

- The key consistent practical challenges to the international cooperation of Sweden in disaster response and recovery seem to be:
 - The chartering of aircraft, for the deployment of teams and equipment, must meet the incident response time criteria. Locating aircraft, with immediate availability, through a broker is a significant challenge.
 - As the MSB is a government agency, a minimum of three quotations must be received from flight charter companies to comply with government agency procurement policy.
 - The cost of chartering flights is often a serious budgetary issue.
- Administrative issues including visas, entry permits, import certificates and carnets are regular challenges for the agency and teams. Irregular monetary requests from some foreign border officials can cause either delay or return of resources.³¹
- Regarding the recruitment and availability of experts for international missions, generally the situation is good. However, there are some challenges with having certain type of expertise such as French speaking logisticians or very high profile and well educated specialists in general disaster response coordination or specialists capable to set up the

²⁸ Expert interviews conducted in June/ July 2011

²⁹ *International emergency response operations in Emergency Response Management, Per-Anders Berthlin/Today's Complex Society - Lars Fredholm and Anna-Lena Göransson (Eds.) (2010)*

³⁰ Expert interviews conducted in June/ July 2011

³¹ *Overview, Swedish International Crisis Preparedness and Response, Philip Wayer/The Institute of Swedish Safety & Security (2011)*

whole CM system of a country recovering from a severe disaster or prolonged civil conflict.³²

3.4 Challenges within the Political and Legal Framework of Greece

Inside Greece

- One of the challenges that the CM in Greece faces is to successfully integrate all the CP forces to a new unified command and control structure that follows the new decentralize fragmentation of Greece.
- The Greek civil protection legal framework defines three layers of decision making at the strategic level and 4 layers of command at the operational level. This results in increased bureaucracy that prevents immediate actions of the involved agencies.³³
- The National Civil Protection Plan “Xenokratis” describes exclusively the framework of the actions each ministry should implement during emergencies. It does not provide details regarding operational service provisions of relevant agencies. This may lead to overlapping actions, especially when two agencies must operate at the same time, in the same place.³⁴
- According to the civil protection framework, the GSCP has a coordination role in civil protection planning with regard to incidents that happen in Greece or abroad. Today, the role of GSCP is rather administrative at high level while the incident management and response activities are performed by the relevant public safety and security services and organizations (e.g. fires are coordinated by the Fire Corps)³⁵.
- Although the army can have a significant role in civil protection, it is rarely used. Normally the army is used during long-lasting disasters and in particular for guarding, search and rescue and mop-up operations (e.g. clearance of debris after earthquakes, etc.). In addition, according to contacted experts, the Greek army doesn’t provide any kind of training to soldiers in order to be able to contribute during emergencies and crises. Only special branches of the army are trained along with civil protection forces (e.g. CBRN teams).³⁶

In collaboration with EU and other international actors

- Greece has a tradition to engage in international search and rescue as well as aid missions in the course of large disasters. Due to vast experience and expertise gained, Greek fire brigades joined international teams participating in operations after disastrous events such as the earthquake of Istanbul and the industrial fire in TURPAS refinery in Turkey (1999), the earthquake in l’Aquila (I) in 2009, the Haiti earthquake in 2010 etc. A major challenge is to continue its international involvement in CP, despite its currnt financial limitations.
- Greece can’t provide and allocate abroad aerial fire fighting support during the fire season, although during this time also large-scale fires in other MS occur, requiring MS’ assistance. Thus, a challenge is how to fill the firefighting-capacity gap of the EU during the dry season in summer. Discussions have been made with governments outside the EU to find ways to use complementary existing firefighting equipments for mutual assistance. Currently, one opportunity discussed is to involve the Australian capacities that are only challenged during the winter period.

³² Expert interviews conducted in June/ July 2011

³³ Expert interviews conducted in June/ July 2011

³⁴ Expert interviews conducted in June/ July 2011

³⁵ Expert interviews conducted in June/ July 2011

³⁶ Expert interviews conducted in June/ July 2011

3.5 The Member States' Perspective: Challenges in the Political and Legal Framework of Aftermath Crisis Management

The challenges stated below have mainly been derived from generalization of the challenges “collected” in the case studies. However, those challenges that would only apply to the corresponding country are not listed here as these would not be relevant for general conclusions. The derived challenges are classified in “coordinative challenges” that constitute the major part of the challenges, the challenges caused by “conflicts of interests”, “financial restraints” and “further challenges”. One should consider that the challenges here refer to the legal and political framework, while the borderline to other challenges is understandably not fixed.

Coordinative challenges (Institutional Set-up)

Challenges in aftermath CM are often not a matter of missing resources, but a matter of coordination.

- In federalist MSs, differences between the administrative units can cause challenges in CM. These challenges can, by the way, mirror the situation of the EU with its MSs. Differences between different administrative units can exist e.g. in command and control, training and equipment, and are also due to different exposures to hazards. It can lead to challenges in collaboration, when a disaster affects more than one administrative unit or cross-border assistance is requested.

This situation is also reflected to a certain extent on EU level. For this reason, MSs typically prefer to establish bilateral or regional programmes/agreements rather than to commit their assets fully to the EU. An example is a bilateral agreement between France and Italy concerning the insurance and chartering of aircrafts. Added value is that conditions under which cooperation is going to happen during the management of a disaster can easier be clarified in detail beforehand.

- Differences between the administrative units can also concern the quantity and quality of equipment, infrastructure and knowledge, which has effect on different expectations on support from the federal level (on EU level: from the EU).
- Challenges generally increase if the collaboration does not concern neighbouring administrative units. Neighbours usually know each other and can act accordingly while systems in administrative units or MSs that are not close by might be less compatible. An illustrative example of trying to improve collaboration in this regard is the FIRE4 project (Italy, Portugal, Spain, France), implemented under the framework of the Union and aiming at promoting exchange of knowledge and resources. It has now evolved to Fire 7 (inclusion of Greece, Cyprus and Belgium) once these countries share a very similar reality on the hazard of forest fires.
- In highly complex civil protection systems such as the Italian, for instance, the coordination matter is often related to the chain of command, as sometimes that is not as clear as it should be. In ordinary crisis, deficiencies in the capabilities of municipalities or less developed regions in remote areas far from the central authority play also a role in the weakening of an effective response to disaster.
- A high level of bureaucracy can prevent immediate actions, e.g. when there are many levels of command and the commands have to pass through all levels.

- Another challenge is the qualification of relevant authorities: Commanders of CM activities on all levels of command should be adequately educated and trained, preferably and increasingly in a multinational environment and following a European harmonized curriculum. A lack of qualified experts in charge can lead to inadequate aftermath CM.
- If the management of forces is organized centrally, the distance between local points of incidents and the commanding centre can be challenging, too, leading to situational pictures not being up-to-date and consequently to less appropriate decisions.
- A big challenge shared among the MS states is the different use of terminology in the field of disaster response and recovery. There is a serious legal gap concerning common definitions. In decentralized systems different use of terminologies can occur within its own legal framework. At EU level with the existence of different languages, different forms of government and traditions, it is even more difficult to achieve consensus on terms and definitions.
- In addition, if different relief organizations are involved, coordination and collaboration among them is important. Sometimes ineffective course of actions can appear due to a lack of collaboration, e.g. when an organization orders material from facilities of the corresponding organization although facilities of another organization would be much closer.
- An important aspect is that CM can fail because of insufficient media management. Different countries have different approaches to this, with different legal/institutional set-ups to deal with the media. A special conflict can be pointed out: Meeting the media's expectations requires resources (e.g. flights over the affected area or interviews with active relief personnel) that will not be available for the actual disaster response actions. But not satisfying the media's needs could enhance wrong pictures presented by the media.³⁷
- Related to the media aspect is the communication with the public. This is not only done through traditional media, but more and more using social media. The EUROCONTROL Twitter account³⁸ is a best-practice example. Authorities need to control the messages to the population in order to control the emergency situation. Social media are a challenge, since rumours and false information can spread more quickly, and is picked up then by traditional media. Emergency authorities should address this in a more harmonized manner across MSs.

Conflicts of interests

Conflicts of interests, e.g. caused by different political ambitions, can have negative effects on an effective functioning of aftermath CM.

- Decisions to provide assistance to other countries are influenced by political goals – and are not always a matter only of solidarity and humanity.
- A general problem is that often the process of CM is not critically and objectively enough reflected in the aftermath of an event. Existing judgements possibly can be influenced for political reasons, preventing an optimal identification and exploitation of lessons learned.

³⁷ E.g. *Naturkatastrophen und die Medien, German Committee for Disaster Reduction (2000):*
www.dkkv.org/de/publications/ressource.asp?ID=59

³⁸ *EUROCONTROL at twitter: <http://twitter.com/#!/eurocontrol>*

- Even the use of resources or personnel can be restricted for political reasons. E.g. in Greece, the Army has a role in civil protection but the political environment is reluctant to use it. Also Army units are not trained in civil protection actions making their role rather supportive instead of decisive.
- International assistance can be restrained because some countries are rather restrictive concerning help from other countries due to political ambitions.

Financial restraints

Providing assistance is not least a matter of finance.

- The possibility of the deployment of several EU missions at the same time can cause a burden being too heavy for the MS. Notably problematic will be the situation of countries that have to cope with many natural hazards within its own territory and face financial difficulties. However, financial restraints are a common problem shared among the majority of the countries.
- A regular occurrence also is that assistance is offered but only under the condition that funding is provided.
- Chartering aircraft is often a matter of finance. An immediate response is challenging, sometimes it is required to receive different quotations from flight charter companies. Also challenging is locating aircraft with immediate availability.
- Administrative issues: E.g. entry permits or other important certificates can take time; irregular money requests can cause delay or return of resources.

Further challenges

The following further challenges are not directly a matter of the legal or political set-up but are indirectly related to them.

- As hazards are multifaceted, it can happen that institutions become actors in CM that are not prepared.
- Standard communication technology: different communication technology is used by different countries, and even by different emergency services in the same country. Harmonization and standardization is very important to allow for a better crisis communication.
- Relationship between scientific/technical offices and emergency management offices: fast response depends often on understanding of the consequences of a disaster immediately, which requires expert scientific advice.
- Validation of a well functioning CM system is restricted in areas that have rarely been affected by hazards. Regular exercises can indicate the success of a CM system but the actual efficiency can be proven only in real crisis.
- Recruitment and availability of experts for international missions can be limited due to several reasons, e.g. a specific foreign language speaking logistician or other, high profile experts for special needs.
- Sometimes the security situation in a disaster area is considered to be too challenging.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

The Conclusions and Recommendations refer to results of the whole work package 2 and thus to both deliverables (D2.1 and D2.2).

Disasters are expected to increase in frequency and magnitude – amongst others, due to the increase of man-made technological, social and environmental risks and climate change. Thus, the need for cooperation within the EU system in the field of CM will most likely remain – if not even rise – in the near future.

The systems for CM in the EU are currently changing, with the Lisbon Treaty as one major driver. For the Lisbon Treaty to have further positive impacts on the coordination between different CM systems at the EU level, the **collaboration between EEAS (including CSDP) and European Commission activities** in disaster response and recovery needs to be improved. So far, the division of responsibilities for CM between the EEAS and the Commission is seen as not evident.

Also the **cooperation with other international organizations, especially the UN and the NATO** is very important, as they also have structures for aftermath CM.

An open but important question is, how the **Solidarity Clause** will be materialized, and how to deal with the tension between solidarity and sovereignty regarding EU cooperation. Associated key questions to be answered are: Where is the “entry point” to the EU-system? Who shall have the leadership in the EU-system? What crises shall trigger the clause – all disasters regardless of its magnitude? Which coordination procedures are appropriate? Which decision-making and coordination mechanisms are to be activated? How could existing structures and procedures be as effectively and efficiently as possible, thus avoiding unnecessary duplication? Should for example different structures be applied for disasters on the one hand and terrorist-attacks on the other hand?

The developments in this area need to be taken into account for the demonstration project in Phase II, and could probably also be directly addressed by assessing potential approaches to the questions.

A basic challenge for EU cooperation is the fact that the political **views regarding the future role of the EU** in aftermath CM, including the MIC/EERC, and also the ability to contribute, very much **differ among the MSs**. As there are no commonly owned EU-assets, EU disaster response and recovery is dependent on the MSs’ assets, structures and their political commitment to contribute.

As a result, concerning future efforts on strengthening EU capabilities and competences, the MSs likely will behave accordingly in their reactions on proposals.

For the Phase II, the different attitudes need to be taken into account. It is important that topics selected, be they technical, organisational or of other kind, are consistent with different political and legal futures.

Especially with neighbouring countries, a direct communication and giving assistance based on **bilateral agreements** between the neighbouring countries is a common fact and **often preferred** instead of activating the EU. An added value of bilateral agreements is that conditions under which cooperation is going to happen during the management of a disaster can easier be clarified in detail beforehand, and the open question is how to find an ‘optimum balance’ between cross-border arrangements and EU cooperation in the area of disaster response and recovery. For Phase II it might be interesting to assess ‘success criteria’ of

cross-border arrangements, and if these criteria can be applied to improve EU cooperation, and vice versa.

The major challenge for the development of a more coherent “system-of-systems” aftermath CM structure in the EU is the **diversity of structures in the MSs**. Important factors that are responsible for differences in the aftermath CM framework at MS level are the governmental systems – decentralized systems (autonomy of administrative units in implementation and execution of disaster response and recovery policies) vs. centralized systems (a national department directly implements measures in case of intense disasters), and variants in between –, high or low occurrence of disasters, often offering or often requesting assistance to other countries, and systems less or highly compatible with EU legislation.

Challenges in the legal and political framework **on the MSs level** need to be taken into account for Phase II, and thus also for the further work in ACRIMAS. An important field is **coordination**, which involves, amongst others, difficulties due to federal structures (which somehow mirrors the situation on EU level), different levels of equipment, infrastructure and knowledge, unclear chains of command, high levels of bureaucracy, different uses of terminology, and improvable media management. **Conflicts of interests** that form challenges include influences of political goals on decisions to provide assistance or not, insufficient critical reflections on past CM actions. Further challenges are **financial restraints** like the general economic situation of MSs, or the restriction that assistance only is offered under the condition that funding is provided.

A further concrete recommendation for the demonstration project in Phase II is the following: As the EU seems to be more ambitious and willing to respond in humanitarian disasters and crises outside EU area, the **security of first responders and humanitarian aid workers** may need more attention. Humanitarian response operations are increasingly taking place in volatile situations that may require increasingly civil-military cooperation. For example, a challenging situation would be if a natural disaster takes place in a fragile state with a request for assistance from the international community, but the disaster-stricken country cannot guarantee the safety of first responders/ humanitarian workers to be deployed. Also, related to the settings of fragile states, value could be added by using civilian response teams (CRTs) under the CSDP civilian instrument to conduct a comprehensive analysis and needs **assessment on the reconstructing and recovery needs** of the affected society after the disaster. Thus, it is a recommended element for the phase II to investigate disaster related situations where both traditional means (through MIC/EERC) and also CSDP tools that are needed to a) improve the security situation, and b) to assist in the recovery phase with a longer term perspective of the rehabilitation of the society.

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(referring to both deliverables, D2.1 and D2.2)

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Annex

Interviews and informal discussions with experts – list of institutions

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- European External Action Service, EUMS Operations Directorate
- German Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK)
- German Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance, Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Protection (AKNZ)
- Hellenic Coastal Guard
- Hellenic Emergency Services (EKAB)
- Hellenic Fire Corps
- Hellenic General Secretariat Of Civil Protection
- Hellenic National Center of Health Management
- Hellenic Police
- Ministry of Interior of Finland
- Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
- Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)
- Universität Bielefeld, Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, Staatslehre und Verfassungsgeschichte
- Universität Witten/Herdecke, Fakultät für Kulturreflexion - Studium fundamentale, Lehrstuhl für Politikwissenschaft